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Abstract 
This study examines the role of a major environmental shock in triggering change in the social 
structure of an organizational field. Based on the longitudinal analysis of changing network 
configurations in the global airline industry, we explore how logics of attachment shift before, 
during and after an exogenous shock and how the rewiring of network ties in response to the shock 
may act as a countervailing force to the network dynamics that drive field stratification. Using the 
terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 as a natural experiment, our work reveals how shocks may 
affect key mechanisms of network evolution thus altering tie distribution and access among 
members of the field. Overall this article contributes to emergent literature on field dynamics by 
exposing the evolution of interorganizational dynamics when external events produce unsettled 
times that render extant logics brittle and open prospect for change. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The agentic turn in institutional theory has marked a shift in attention from the normative forces that 
stabilize interorganizational fields toward consideration of the processes by which such fields 
transform (Fligstein, 2001). Opportunities for radical transformation of existing fields have often 
been suggested to arise primarily from large scale events that impose crises on the field and are 
experienced as severe ruptures in its social structure (Meyer, 1982; Sine and David, 2003). There 
are a number of studies that have highlighted the role of exogenous shocks in exposing rules that 
had been taken for granted, calling into question the perceived benefits of those rules, and 
undermining the calculations on which field relations had been based (McAdam and Scott, 2005). It 
is during these convulsive moments that, as pointed out by Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 4) “new 
logics of action and interaction come into existence” that may shuffle resources and thereby alter 
the relationships within the field. Powell et al. (2005: 1190) similarly note that “shocks to any 
system […] can destabilize it and result in a tip in the rules of affiliation and the resulting 
combinatorial possibilities”. Scholars in the social movement theory too have advanced the idea that 
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exogenous shocks may alter the underlying social fabric of fields by catalysing the mobilization of 
peripheral actors who can advance their position in the social structure (Thornton, 2002).  
In our view, belying the abundant evidence that emphasizes the role of exogenous shocks in 
subverting the existing social order, is the comparative absence of theoretical and empirical work on 
the network mechanisms – those that are thought to regulate the likelihood that particular 
relationships materialize – that bring about such transformations. Prior work on change in 
interorganizational fields has emphasized the tendency of interorganizatinal networks to reproduce 
themselves over time (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999), resulting in increasingly stratified social 
structures. According to this view, which is reminiscent of the Mertonian principle of the rich get 
richer, highly connected organizations in the pre-existing network structure are more likely to form 
subsequent ties with highly connected partners, while firms that are not as well connected remain in 
the periphery of the network. Yet, in contrast to the prevailing self-reproducing conception of the 
social structure, theorists have raised the possibility that networks change because of external crises 
that produce unsettled times, rendering existing logics of action and interaction brittle and opening 
prospects for transformation (Madhavan et al., 1998). Unfortunately such punctuated accounts of 
socio-economic change say little about what logics of attachment are poised for change consequent 
to exogenous shocks or how such logics cumulatively shape the evolutionary trajectory at the 
interorganizational field level. Addressing this knowledge gap is important for the advancement of 
current understanding in field dynamics, as the way fields change rests on the particular 
relationships of its actors and “change to these relationships are a powerful source of change to a 
field” (Sauder, 2008: 210). Accordingly the present article asks, How do field actors alter their 
interorganizational affiliations in response to transient shocks that disrupt fields temporarily? What 
logics of attachment prevail in the aftermath of large scale-events that have the effect of creating a 
sense of generalized uncertainty?  These questions lie at the heart of field theory, as they draw our 
attention to the relational “structuration” of organizational fields (Phillips et al., 2000).  
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The theoretical orientation we follow to address these questions brings together ideas 
generated by field and network theorists. From field theorists we borrow the understanding of field 
as a “network or configuration of relations between positions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 17) 
and as social arenas where actors frame their actions vis-à-vis one another and struggle to secure 
and preserve social and material benefits (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011). This competition gives 
rise to social structure, understood here as social topology, which constitutes different profit 
opportunities (Fligstein, 2001). As noted by Beckert (2010: 612) “since profit stems from the 
relative position of a firm in the network actors have diverging interests with regard to the 
reproduction and change of existing network”.  In its simplest expression this is a struggle between 
incumbent actors who embrace a frame of reference that encapsulates their self-serving view of the 
field and thus strive for the reproduction of network positions, and peripheral actors who seek 
avenues for improving their position.  
From network theorists we borrow arguments concerning how the topology of a network 
and the mechanisms of tie formation/dissolution among its constituents orient the choice of partners 
and ultimately shape the structure of the field. Drawing on network evolution literature (Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999; Snijders, 2001; Powell et al., 2005; Rivera et al., 2010) we explore different 
sources of attachment bias and examine if and how these simple rules that guide the process of 
partner selection shift in the aftermath of an exogenous shock that destabilizes the entire field. In 
doing so, we move away from the depiction of social change as an invariant process affecting all 
actors equally, and emphasize instead its different ramifications depending on an actor’s location in 
the overall network, as that structure evolves over time (Powell et al., 2005; Powell and Owen-
Smith, 2012). Our intuition is that patterns of interorganizational network ties provide a lens 
through which to view critical junctures that question extant logics and open prospect for change, 
enabling us to shed light on organizational responses to external events.  
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To explore these ideas empirically and inform our understanding of the interorganizational 
dynamics characterizing fields that undergo cataclysmic upheavals we focus on the global airline 
industry in the aftermath  of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks (henceforth 9/11), which 
caused one of the most severe crises ever experienced by civil aviation worldwide. Given the 
exploratory, theory-building nature of the study we employ a hybrid research design that combines 
qualitative data analysis with quantitative social network analysis, enabling us to capture “a more 
complete, holistic and contextual portrayal of the units under study” (Jick, 1979: 603). We first 
offer a comprehensive overview of the main factors that have shaped the evolution of the 
commercial field of global air transportation over the past fifteen years. We turn next to a closer 
examination of the dynamics of interorganizational attachment of field members. To assess the 
evolving topology of the field in relation to the occurrence of the shock we draw on 9 years (1998-
2006) of alliance records that capture the formation and dissolution of collaborative relationships. 
From this data we extract and map several network properties in the periods pre-, during and post-
shock which offer an appreciative understanding of how the logics of attachment switch, with 
divergent ramifications depending on whether the actors are central or peripheral players in the 
context of the field. We then turn to a statistical analysis of the micro-mechanisms that govern 
actors’ interorganizational choices and link these mechanisms to the evolution of field-level 
network patterns. For this analysis we use stochastic actor-based models for network dynamics 
(Snijders, 2005; Snijders et al., 2010). This modelling approach is especially appropriate for our 
analysis for at least two reasons. In the first place, it focuses on the micro-level mechanisms that 
drive actors’ choices as factors of change at the network level. Further, it overcomes the problems 
that network interdependence poses to estimation and testing, and is the only tried and tested 
approach that does so in a truly longitudinal fashion. Using actor-based stochastic network models 
(Snijders, 2005) we examine a few mechanisms that have been featured in previous work on 
network evolution: degree distribution, assortativity (or degree-based homophily), transitivity, and 
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preferential attachment. Each of these statistics provides a different yet complementary insight into 
the interplay of network dynamics and field structuration in the aftermath of an environmental 
shock. We trace these bases of interaction in the pre-, during and post-shock period and in doing so 
we address recent calls to increase our understanding of whether “different [network] mechanisms 
play greater or lesser roles as networks evolve” (Rivera et al., 2010: 108). 
Our findings suggest that the shock engenders a blended logic of partner selection. On the 
one hand, we find systematic differences in the pre- and post-shock eras in the pattern of 
connections that link the most prominent members of the field to one another and to more 
peripheral alters. More specifically, the shock appears to push the network towards disassortativity 
and “poor get richer” dynamics (or preferential avoidance) (Qiao et al., 2014) causing an inversion 
in the correlation patterns in the degree of connected nodes and making peripheral actors more 
attractive partners. On the other hand, we find that the shock accelerates the clustering tendency of 
the network as captured by different measures of network transitivity. After the upheaval, in other 
words, interactions with a common third party induce stronger triadic closure resulting in a more 
cohesive structure. Thus, in the wake of the exogenous shock triadic closure, disassortativity and 
preferential avoidance operate as simultaneous structuring forces, with the former enhancing 
cohesion and reliability of exchanges (Uzzi, 1997) and the latter two preventing insularity and 
pulling in peripheral players, more likely to aid in exploration and renewal. In the closing part of the 
manuscript we offer a discussion of the study’s main implications, limitations and promising areas 
for future research.  
 
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
Fields, networks and shocks 
Bourdieu (1984, 1992) has presented one of the most elaborate theoretical statements about the 
structure of fields. Bourdieu positions actors in social space, or topography, where they compete to 
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secure and preserve social, material and symbolic benefits. This competition gives rise to social 
structure, understood here as social topology, which positions actors relative to each other 
according to the combination of symbolic and social resources available to them. The structural 
outcomes of this competition are usually conceptualized as dichotomies that classify actors into 
incumbents and challengers, insiders and outsiders, core and peripheral players (Anheier et al., 1995; 
Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). On the one hand core players serve as arbiters for the direction of 
the field.  Being strongly embedded in the field and dependent upon the worldview subsumed by it 
they use their clout to reinforce the existing institutional arrangements, especially when their 
interests appear to be well served by the prevailing settlement. Peripheral players, on the other hand, 
strive to improve their position and change the balance of control over resources within the field but 
they are hindered by their low status and limited resources in convincing others to partake in their 
project. As a result, the social structure of fields proves typically highly resistant to peripheral 
players’ challenges.   
In rare instances, however, such stratification order may not be strong enough to forestall 
convulsive moments triggered by exogenous shocks or other dramatic events that suddenly alter the 
relations within the field, setting in motion “a period of prolonged and widespread crisis in which 
actors struggle to reconstitute all aspects of social life” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011: 32). Events 
of such kind include the French Revolution, the Great Depression and the economic crisis of the 
1970s. These events, also known as environmental jolts, represent significant milestones in the 
evolution of a field and play a key role in enabling transformative change (Fligstein, 1997, 2011; 
Meyer, 1982) by reshuffling control over resources and thereby providing avenues for action for 
some actors while hindering others. After such moments of possibility things eventually settle down 
and a more stable order returns. Unfortunately, such punctuated accounts of social change say little 
about what precise patterns of interaction emerge, take root and transform in response to sudden 
shifting environmental circumstances. Do core actors respond to exogenous shocks by turning their 
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attention inward to connections with other core players, thus creating an increasingly stratified elite? 
Alternatively, do they prospect for more diverse peripheral partners who seek the legitimacy and 
resources that accrue from affiliation to core players?  
The perspective we adopt to tackle these questions rests on the idea that organizational fields   
are structured by relationships that function both as pipes through which resources and practices are 
diffused and as prisms that provide signals of status and identity (Podolny, 2001). Because 
differently positioned organizations garner different status and control benefits, some organizations 
may be more responsive to suddenly shifting circumstances. As suggested by Fligstein and 
McAdam (2011: 10): “Different actors in different positions will vary in their interpretation of 
events and respond to them from their own point of view”. Our intuition is that the patterns of 
interaction that link central members of the network with one another and with less well-positioned 
alters offer a lens through which to examine periods of ferment, enabling us to flesh out endogenous 
network mechanisms that operate in response to exogenous events. In particular, by examining the 
dynamics of interorganizational tie formation and dissolution of field members in the pre- and post-
jolt eras, we can distil how rules of attachment vary over time. As we shall see the actors may well 
play by different rules of partner selection at different stages in the evolution of the network, 
depending on their position in the social structure and the characteristics of their current and/or 
prospective partners. 
 
Dynamics of network change in interorganizational fields 
We enter the discussion of interorganizational network dynamics with data from a field where 
political and market forces loom large in shaping patterns of attachment. Unlike other industries 
where collaborative ties are forged to last, the airline industry has been characterized over the past 
twenty years by strong pressure towards deregulation and liberalization that have resulted in a high 
rate of formation and dissolution of interorganizational linkages. Because of endogenous and 
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exogenous discontinuities the industry has also witnessed a significant amount of entry and exit into 
the field, with a small elite of highly connected incumbents exerting considerable influence over the 
developmental pattern of the overall network, and newcomers seeking the relational imprimatur of 
these core players positioned at the centre of the stage. The challenge to understand the shifting 
topology of this complex highly stratified field is to link the overall structure with the affiliation 
choices of its constituting actors and examining how these choices shape the evolution of the field 
at critical points in time.  
As a point of departure for examining such link we focus on assortativity (or degree-based 
homophily), a key attachment mechanism that network theorists (Watts, 2004) as well as 
interorganizational network scholars (Powell et al., 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) have 
identified as being conducive to the kind of stratified social structures (Borgatti and Everett, 1999) 
that distinguish Bourdieusian fields. Assortativity reflects the degree to which nodes with similar 
degrees connect to each other (Watts 2004). It implies that nodes with numerous connections are 
more likely to be linked to other nodes with numerous connections while low degree nodes connect 
to other low degree nodes. Scholars in the network perspective on interfirm collaboration suggest 
that these dynamics – somehow reminiscent of Merton’s cumulative dynamics (1968) – result from 
the tendency of highly embedded organizations in a network, that is organizations with many 
interorganizational ties that provide them with a central position in the network, to form additional 
ties with other highly embedded organizations to mitigate collaboration hazards (Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999). By contrast organizations with few connections located at the periphery of the 
network, lack informational and reputation benefits which constraints their ability to work their way 
towards the centre of the network. A topology dominated by assortative logic thus results in divide 
between an ‘elite club’ situated in the core and ‘the mass’, represented by peripheral players. 
Disassortativity occurs when nodes with many connections prefer to link to nodes with few 
connections and vice versa. Because exogenous shocks increase uncertainty and alter the 
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configuration of the resource space, a change in the assortative logic of the field may follow it.  As 
noted by Ahuja et al. (2012: 437): “Significant changes in assortativity might signal a shift in the 
resource requirements for success in the interorganizational field”.  
We supplement the idea of assortativity with other attachment mechanisms that sociologists 
have repeatedly found to be important in the evolution of social structures. The first mechanism, 
which nicely complements the assortative one, is preferential attachment or the tendency of an 
organization to attach to another organization that already has ties. Preferential attachment 
purportedly occurs because actors looking for new connections use an actor’s degree as a proxy for 
their fitness (Rivera et al., 2010). The extreme case would result into a star network with one central 
node being connected to every other node, leading to an average path length under two. Significant 
evidence indicates that alliance networks are structured by preferential attachment because larger 
and more prestigious firms tend to attract and sustain a far greater number of alliances than smaller 
or less prestigious firms (Stuart, 1998). Underlying this logic of attachment in interorganizational 
networks is the understanding of organizations as status-seeking (Podolny, 1994). Because 
organizations’ status rankings are a function of the status rankings of their partners, lower status 
organizations search for ties to higher status organizations who attempt to avoid ties with lower 
status players. The second mechanism we analyse is based on Simmel’s triadic closure (Simmel, 
1950) or the tendency of open triads to close. Triads, subsets of three actors and the possible ties 
among them, play a key role in relating micro-structural tendencies with macro-structural patterns 
being at the intersection between dyadic relationships and overall networks (or parts of it). Triads 
are central to the formation of relationships due to the transitivity principle (Granovetter, 1973). 
Transitivity is the tendency of forming mutual ties by two actors A and B that are connected to a 
third common party C, thus resulting in triadic closure. At the dyadic level this implies that prior 
indirect ties – at geodesic distance of two – turn into direct ties. Triadic closure is a very strong 
structural tendency and empirical evidence consistent with it has been found in a variety of 
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interorganizational settings (see for instance Madhavan et al., 2004; Lazzarini et al., 2008; Ferriani 
et al., 2013). The third mechanism we examine is nodal degree or the simple tendency of actors to 
instantiate new relationships. Within our setting this mechanism captures the extent to which 
airlines respond to the changed environmental conditions by expanding or reducing their alliance 
network. On the one hand, to cope with the increased uncertainty that follows exogenous shocks 
firms may strengthen existing ties and refrain from establishing new ones (Krackhard,t 1992). An 
example of this pattern can be found in Podolny (1994), who posits that the proclivity of 
organizations to re-instantiate past relationships increases with uncertainty in market conditions. On 
the other hand, under increasing uncertainty firms might seek more flexibility and options (Owen-
Smith and Powell 2004), which would suggest that large upheavals in a network or shocks that 
change the environmental or market conditions within which a network is embedded may lead to 
greater partnering activity and a consequent increase in the parameter capturing the actor’s 
propensity to establish new ties. A similar conundrum is present in organizational theory (Staw et 
al., 1981), do firms respond to threat by becoming more active or by becoming more rigid?  
By analysing how these mechanisms play out in the wake of an exogenous shock we seek to 
extend prior related research on interorganizational change and field dynamics that has attended to 
such key aspects as logics of attachment (Powell et al., 2005), network topology (Sytch et al., 2012), 
and more broadly the impact of industry events on the relational structuration of fields (Madhavan 
et al., 1998; Powell and Owen-Smith, 2012). While a more comprehensive view of 
interorganizational network change might include other network mechanisms, our main objective 
here is to make a first step towards more clarity and analytical tractability in studying the relational 
dynamics that shape fields at critical evolutionary junctures that open prospects for change.  
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING: THE GLOBAL AIRLINE INTERORGANIZATIONAL FIELD 
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Our empirical focus is on the commercial field of air transportation, which has undergone 
deregulation and liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, significant development of bilateral airline 
alliances as preferred mode of expansion in the 1990s, and the emergence of multilateral alliances 
and consolidation in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This field is known for being inherently global, 
characterized by a mixture of competition and collaboration. Globalization and deregulation have 
been identified as the two phenomena that have radically changed the air transport industry and its 
rules over the past thirty years (Iatrou and Oretti, 2007). Globalization forced airlines to cater for 
the needs of a global market by operating across national boundaries. Deregulation and 
liberalization increased competition dramatically and paved the way for the emergence of low cost 
carriers. Faced with these challenges, the commercial airline industry has been marked by a heavy 
reliance on interorganizational networks (Iatrou and Oretti, 2007). For example, in 2000 more than 
80% of global airline carriers engaged in some form of alliance (Baker, 2001). In the early years of 
cooperation, alliances were confined to tie formation between two carriers mainly in the form of a 
code-sharing agreement where two airlines cross-sell each other’s capacity on selected routes, or 
one carrier markets its code on another’s flights. Cooperation at this level was generally limited to 
specific routes or regions, and the carriers involved are still marketed as independent companies. 
Starting from the mid-1990s, the pressures stemming from both deregulation and globalization 
increased sensitively influencing the nature of competition within the airline industry. Once again, 
airlines reaction was to forge alliances. In their quest to achieve global reach, based on the 
assumption that those that offer a global service (with a credible presence in each of the major air 
travel markets) will be in the strongest competitive position, airlines realized that multilateral 
alliances or constellations (Gomes-Casseres, 1994) would have been more adequate for that 
purpose1. By the end of the 1990s the field was divided into constellation members and non-aligned 
carriers which enjoyed relatively more freedom in their partnership choices. This is the period we 
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focus on, with data from 1998 to 2006. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of airline membership in 
alliance constellations.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The main three multilateral airline alliances are Star Alliance, SkyTeam and oneworld which 
control the 69% of world revenue passenger kilometres. At the time of our study, there were two 
additional constellations, Qualiflyer and Wings. These constellations involve full marketing 
cooperation with respect to frequent flyer programs (FFPs) and promotion (including investments in 
common brand name), besides joint access to airport facilities controlled by individual members 
(Lazzarini, 2007: 347). They also offer comprehensive code-sharing agreements involving several 
routes instead of bilateral agreements comprising few routes (Oum and Yu, 1998). However, the 
interorganizational field we explore is not stable, it shifts markedly through the formation of new 
alliances and dissolution of existing ones, as agreements are ended, new players join the ranks and 
businesses fail. The evolving structure of these interorganizational linkages is the focus of our 
network study. We analyse patterns in the formation and dissolution of ties between airlines in the 
wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a key trigger to field transformation.   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
We explored the evolutionary dynamics of the global airline industry using longitudinal data on 
alliances formed between 1998 and 2006. In line with prior work (Lazzarini, 2007) we identified an 
alliance as any code-sharing agreement between two airline companies. All airlines that had formed 
at least one alliance during the period of our study were included in the database. Data on airline 
alliances and their change over time were collected through company reports and several issues of 
the Airline Business magazine. These issues contain data on code-sharing agreements but exclude 
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cooperation on frequent flyer programs as well as alliances among charter and cargo carriers which 
are not the focus of this study.  
We used these data to build a series of sociomatrices. These are binary symmetric matrices 
whose entry on row i and column j (Xij, same as Xji) equals to 1 if a code-sharing agreement 
existed between companies i and j, and 0 otherwise. One sociomatrix was coded for each year of the 
interval 1998-2006, our period of observation, and this resulted in a panel network dataset of nine 
adjacency matrices. We used this panel network dataset for modelling the evolution of the network 
of code-sharing agreements between airlines across the period of observation using the SIENA 
actor-based models of network change (Snijders, 2005). These models reconcile the inquiry of the 
macro-level evolution of the network with a focus on the individual choices of the actors (Felin and 
Foss, 2005), thus making possible to strike a balance between the competing emphases on structure 
or agency in the study of networks. Within this framework the global evolution of the network is 
modelled as driven by the choices actors make about establishing new ties or interrupting old ones, 
based on their preferences about local configurations of ties. While the emergent result of these 
choices drives the evolution of the whole network, choices themselves are conditioned by broad 
network patterns that are outside the control of any individual actor. The statistical modelling of the 
evolution of the airline alliance network is preceded by a mapping of the evolution of the field in 
the pre-, the during and post-jolt periods, based on a variety of network diagnostics which allow us 
to delineate a rich contextual framework with which to better understand the changing dynamics of 
the network over time.  
Information on airlines operations were collected from IATA and ICAO statistics. The 
database includes information on individual airlines observed over time. The final sample consists 
of an unbalanced panel of 261 airlines, including companies that have disappeared from the 
business arena and those that were founded during the analysis period. Among these a subsample 
was selected that consisted of the companies that met at least one of these requirements: 1) they 
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were included in the Lazzarini (2007) sample, 2) they were identified by industry experts as 
important field players 3) they belonged to the main connected component of the network at least 
once across the nine observed years 1998-2006. This resulted in a subsample of 132 actors observed 
across the nine years period that decreased from the 128 actors observed in 1998 to the 107 in 2006. 
The information about code-sharing agreements was coded in nine binary and symmetric adjacency 
matrices 132x132.  
In addition to the quantitative data, and in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of 
our quantitative findings, we collected qualitative evidence by performing eleven semi-structured 
interviews with experienced professionals and key informants in the airline industry (see Table 1). 
The questions asked were open-ended ones and aimed at uncovering the role and importance of the 
alliance network in the pre and post 9/11 eras. All informants are experts in alliance management 
and/or business development. These interviews had an approximate length of one hour each and 
were carried between February 2012 and May 2014. All interviews were digitally recorded and 
transcribed. Despite the information being mainly retrospective, these interviews provided valuable 
insight into the firms’ alliance tactics and resilience strategies in the face of the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
that add richness to our quantitative findings. We draw on selective quotes from some of the 
managers we interviewed wherever relevant in the paper. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Network mechanisms 
In our modelling approach actors are assumed to add or remove outgoing ties according to their 
preferences for alternative local network configurations, formalized as a hypothesized random 
utility function. The parameter estimates thus provide a model for the rules governing the dynamic 
change in the network (Snijders et al., 2010). The parameters we focus on are those that 
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operationalize the attachment mechanisms in each of the four variants presented earlier: 
assortativity, preferential attachment, triadic closure and nodal degree (note that while we include 
the variable ‘Degree’ among our controls, as it is common practice to do so in SIENA models to 
account for the baseline relational tendency of network members, yet this variable assumes for us 
special theoretical interest when interacted with the time dummies). We now describe such 
structural effects along with the control variables.   
Parameters of interest. The mechanism of triadic closure in our models is represented by the 
‘Transitive Triads’ parameter. This parameter measures the extent to which two airlines that share a 
network contact (i.e. maintain a code-sharing agreement with the same third company) tend to 
establish a code-sharing agreement among them. This micro-level mechanism, which may be 
represented graphically by a closed triangle and is often referred to either as triadic closure, 
transitive closure or simply transitivity, has important large scale consequences for the structure of 
the network. In fact, the higher is the transitivity in the network (i.e. the more frequent are closed 
triads or triangles), the more the network tends to be structured into internally cohesive subgroups. 
The ‘Degree Assortativity’ parameter measures the propensity of network actors to establish ties 
with other actors that have similar degree to them. In our context this means that airlines with many 
code-sharing agreements tend to establish new agreements (or keep existing ones) with other 
companies that themselves have already many such agreements, and airlines with few agreements 
tend to ally with companies that similarly have few agreements. The ‘Degree of Alter’ parameter 
operationalizes the preferential attachment mechanism through which popular actors (i.e. actors 
with high degree) become even more popular. This parameter measures the extent to which network 
actors (independently from their own degree) tend to choose as new contacts other actors who 
already have high degree; in our context this translates into airlines preference (independently from 
how many code-sharing agreements they have) to establish new agreements with partners that 
already have many code-sharing agreements. 
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Control variables. The ‘Degree’ parameter measures the propensity of actors to maintain ties. The 
role of this parameter in SIENA models is that of controlling for the number of ties (i.e. density) of 
the network, in order to rule out the possibility that higher order structural patterns (like transitivity 
for example) are the mere by product of network density. The negative value that this parameter 
typically takes corresponds to the low density of the networks composed of more than a few actors, 
and indicates a negative propensity of actors to maintain ties for their own sake; a tie is initiated 
only when its cost is outweighed by other components of the utility function that receive positive 
parameter estimates. The ‘Degree’ effect may be referred to as endogenous in that it is a structural 
feature of the network that takes an explanatory role (such as the x of a regression) in modelling the 
network itself (which here takes the role of the y). The average propensity to maintain ties measured 
by the degree parameter may vary across the airlines depending on attributes like size or other. 
These are exogenous effects since they represent the impact on network structure of factors 
observed at the level of individual companies. We controlled for the following actor level attributes. 
We use country- and region-specific variables to control for time-varying effects related to carriers’ 
domestic markets, which are likely to affect their likelihood to collaborate. ‘North’ is a dummy 
variable valued 1 for the airlines that belong to countries in the northern hemisphere, precisely those 
that were coded as European, North American or from Asia-Pacific countries. This variable 
measures the differences in the propensity to establish ties for companies from the north hemisphere 
compared to the ones from the southern emisphere2. ‘Gdp growth’ controls for the differences in the 
propensity to establish ties that may be possibly related to the speed of economic growth in the 
home country of each airline since the demand for air transport is directly linked to economic 
growth. The dummy ‘Alliance’ equals to 1 if an airline is a member of one of the five constellations 
in existence during our study period (Star Alliance, SkyTeam, oneworld, Qualiflyer and Wings) and 
0 if the airline is not a member of any constellation. The parameter associated to this variable 
measures the differences in the propensity to establish ties for members of one of the five 
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constellations compared to non-constellation members. ‘Experience’ is the age of the airline 
measured as the number of years since its foundation. A positive parameter estimate reflects a 
higher propensity of older airlines to build and retain ties compared to younger airlines. ‘Fleet Size’ 
is the size of the airline measured as the number of aircrafts it operates. A positive parameter 
estimate indicates a higher propensity to maintain ties for larger airlines. ‘Load Factor’ measures 
the operating efficiency of the airline as the amount of utilization of the total available capacity. 
This is measured as the Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK) divided by the Available Seat 
Kilometres (ASK). A positive parameter estimate indicates a higher propensity to maintain ties for 
the airlines with high load factor, those that exploit their capacity better. Finally, we control for 
another common indicator of performance in the airline industry which corresponds to the total 
scheduled passenger traffic (‘Passengers’). A positive parameter estimate indicates a higher 
propensity to maintain ties for airlines with greater passenger traffic. In order to take into account 
alternative explanations of ties based on homophily of the airlines over these attributes, we include 
similarity effects defined over all these control variables. In all cases, a positive parameter implies 
that actors prefer to establish ties to others who are similar to them on that attribute. For example, a 
positive load factor similarity estimate would indicate that actors with similar load factors are more 
likely to collaborate. The variable ‘Same Alliance’ measures the extent to which airlines tend to 
establish code-sharing agreements preferably with members of their same constellation. 
Interactions with time dummies. To discern variations in patterns of interaction over time we 
partitioned our period of observation in three sub-periods: 1) the pre-jolt era (1998-2001), 2) the jolt 
(2001-2003) era and 3) the post-jolt (2003-2006). We then estimated the interactions of our 
parameters of interest (i.e. ‘Transitive Triads’, ‘Degree of Alter’ and ‘Degree Assortativity’) with 
‘Dummy 2001-2003’ and ‘Dummy 2003-2006’ to assess the existence of time heterogeneity in the 
parameters. We take 1998-2001 as the reference period and assess whether differences existed with 
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respect to such period in the network structural dynamics in 2001-2003 (Dummy 2001-2003) and in 
2003-2006 (Dummy 2003-2006). 
 
Estimation procedure  
We model the evolution of the network of code-sharing agreements by using SIENA actor-based 
models of network change (Snijders, 2005). These models are actor-based since they analyse 
network evolution as resulting from the aggregation of the choices that individual actors make to 
create new ties or discontinue old ones. In our alliance network the creation of a tie is modelled as 
the common choice of two airlines where one takes the initiative and the other has to confirm; for 
the dissolution of an alliance the confirmation is not required (unilateral initiative and reciprocal 
confirmation; Ripley et al., 2013: 43). Individual network actors choose with whom to create a new 
tie or discontinue an old one based on their preferences about local configurations of relations. The 
dynamic tendencies of the network are then modelled as the components of the utility function that 
the airlines try to maximize by choosing other airlines with whom to initiate a new alliance or 
dissolve an existing one. The parameters associated to the components of the utility function are 
estimated by simulations of the evolution of the network between consecutive observations that are 
iterated until convergence on a set of parameter estimates is obtained. Based on these parameter 
estimates another series of simulations is performed which produces an estimate of the standard 
errors. Simulations allow an assessment of the probability distribution of the parameters estimates 
that is needed for testing, whose exact analytical form remains unknown. This is a general issue in 
analysing network dynamics, because of the departure from the standard assumption of 
independence of observations that is intrinsic to the task of assessing structural tendencies, 
equivalent to that of assessing forms of interdependence between ties. Structural zeros in the 
adjacency matrices are used for dealing with changing membership in the network during the 
observed period, as explained by Ripley et al. (2013). 
20 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics. We include the number of companies present each year as 
well as the average and the standard deviations of the control variables included in our models, 
namely the size of the companies, in our case computed using fleet size, their experience and load 
factor, the percentage of airlines belonging to one of the three regions of the northern part of the 
hemisphere, GDP percent growth and the passengers carried. Table 3 shows the correlations of the 
variables included in the estimations. We also computed the Jaccard index to gauge the similarity of 
two consecutive observations and hence the amount of change in the network. The Jaccard index 
measures the similarity of two networks by discarding the ties that do not exist in either network, in 
order to avoid inflating the similarity of sparse networks whose adjacency matrices are filled mainly 
with zeros. This index remains within an acceptable range during the observation period, with a 
maximum in 2004-2005 (Jaccard = .84; slow change) and a minimum in 1998-1999 (Jaccard = .63; 
fast change). 
 
[Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here] 
 
 Table 4 shows the results of the SIENA models. The convergence of the estimation 
algorithm was very good for all models, with the t statistics for all parameters below 0.1, which is 
the typical convergence threshold in SIENA models. In SIENA models all the parameters are 
coefficients of the utility function that actors try to maximize by choosing to create new ties, to 
maintain existing ties, or to terminate them. If a parameter is positive, then there is a higher 
probability of moving toward a network configuration where that variable has a higher value or, in 
other words, that the variable associated with such parameter drives network evolution; the opposite 
is true if the parameter value is negative (Lazega et al., 2011). 
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 In the control model (model 1), we included both endogenous and exogenous effects. The 
degree parameter is significant and negative suggesting that actors are generally reluctant to form 
ties. This finding is common in network evolution models as actors draw no benefit from forming 
random ties to other network members which are not part of specific local structures. With respect 
to firm characters we find that actors with significant experience are more likely to be involved in 
tie formation. For the similarity measures, we find that airlines that belong to Europe, Asia-Pacific 
and North America (north hemisphere), airlines that belong to the same multilateral alliance, and 
airlines originating from countries with similar GDP growth are more likely to cooperate with each 
other. On the other hand, we observe that experienced firms are more likely to choose partners with 
less experience, and vice versa.  
 In models 2a and 2b we include the parameters of interest which correspond to the rules of 
attachment described earlier (we have two variants of this model as we found “assortativity” and 
“degree of alter” highly correlated. Accordingly, the effects of these two variables were estimated 
separately). The positive and significant parameter ‘transitive triads’ indicates that open triads tend 
to close. As previously noted this result is quite recurrent in a variety of networks since actors 
generally tend to become “friends of their friends” (Granovetter, 1973). The parameter ‘degree 
assortativity’ is negative but not significant. Therefore, when one considers the whole 9-year period, 
the presence of assortative mixing based on degree is not confirmed. Similarly, there is no 
significant preferential attachment (or rich get richer) effect as the parameter ‘degree of alter’ is 
positive but not significant. With the exception of experience and experience similarity, controls 
that are significant in model 1 continue to be significant, and in the same direction, in both models 2 
and 3.  
The social dynamics of the network vary when one takes into account time heterogeneity. We 
do so in models 3a and 3b, where we interact the variables of theoretical interest with two time 
dummies capturing the jolt (2001-2003) and post jolt (2003-2006) periods. The parameter ‘degree’ 
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remains negative and significant. However, the interaction between ‘degree’ and the two time 
dummies is positive and significant suggesting that in the aftermath of the shock the cost of 
establishing linkages decreases or, stated differently, actors are relatively more inclined towards 
creating new partnerships. We integrate this finding with a portrait of the trends in degree 
distributions for the years 1998-2006, illustrated in figure 2. Degree distributions are often used as a 
diagnostic indicator to assess if tie formation in a network is equiprobable for all pairs of nodes or 
biased proportional to existing ties of potential partners (Powell et al., 2005). Figure 2 shows the 
degree distribution in the airline field for three distinct periods, before, during, and after the jolt. 
The x-axis indicates the number of ties per company (i.e. degree) and the y-axis indicates the 
number of companies. We see in the picture that the number of companies having very few 
connections drops significantly over the three periods. This result suggests that the years after 2001 
marked a long-term shift in relational logics leading to an increasingly less stratified field. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
When interacted with the time dummies, the parameter for degree assortativity changes 
significantly. We find that both in the immediate aftermath of the jolt and in the period that 
followed, disassortativity occurs as confirmed by the negative and significant interactions between 
‘degree assortativity’ and both time dummies. Actors that occupy prominent positions in the field 
exhibit an increasing propensity towards forging alliances with more peripheral actors and vice 
versa. Since disassortativity is often driven by complementarity needs (Ahuja et al., 2012), a 
possible interpretation is that the jolt induces actors towards a stronger preference for diversity. 
Note that most high-degree airlines belonged to the Northern hemisphere (namely Asia, Europe and 
North America) and that 9/11 hit these regions more severely. Not only a reorientation of these 
carriers’ alliance strategy towards diversity allowed them to compensate for demand reduction in 
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their Transatlantic and Transpacific routes, but it also enabled them to expand their presence in 
local markets which were less hit by the jolt. At the same time, peripheral players attaching to high 
degree players could take advantage of status and reputation transfer. One such example is provided 
by the code-sharing agreement established between Lufthansa and the much smaller regional carrier 
Aegean Airlines. The latter’s CEO commented the cooperation between the two carriers as follows 
(Aegean, 2005): 
 
“Lufthansa, one of the world’s leading airlines, has done us proud by recognising us as 
a strong regional partner. We are delighted at becoming Lufthansa’s partner in Greece 
as we are with the opportunity of offering our passengers connections into Lufthansa's 
global route network” 
 
The tendency towards transitive closure is stronger both in the jolt and post-jolt periods as 
indicated by the positive and statistically significant interaction terms between “transitive triads” 
and the two time dummies. The increase in clustering after the shock is significant especially in the 
immediacy of the shock, suggesting that the large upheaval in the network acts as a catalyst for 
retrenchment and cohesion. In other words, the jolt seems to trigger relationships that increase the 
organizations’ embeddedness into the network rather than a motivation to alter the present structure 
with new bridging ties (Galaskiewicz and Shatin, 1981; Podolny, 1994). These findings suggest that 
the returns to cohesion, such as reliability and trust, provide especially appealing benefits when 
field actors have to cope with convulsive moments triggered by exogenous shocks that suddenly 
disturb field-level consensus causing indeterminacy (Clemens and Cook, 1999).  
The interaction between degree of alter and the time dummies yields also interesting results. 
Both interactions are negative although the degree of alter parameter is significant only in the post-
jolt period. These results support a ‘poor get richer’ argument indicating that actors with lower 
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degrees become more attractive partners in the post-jolt period compared to the period before the 
jolt. Our perspective on this trend builds on the idea of “structure-loosening” event (Madhavan et 
al., 1998). A structure-loosening event is believed to occur when the poor get richer or when highly 
central actors forgo a central position while more peripheral actors become more central. To explore 
this argument, we turn to examine the core-periphery dynamics of the field over the study period. In 
an idealized core-periphery structure, the core is a group of nodes that are connected to all other 
nodes of both the core and the periphery. The periphery is a group of nodes that are not connected 
to each other but only to the nodes in the core. Although no real social network conforms to this 
ideal, an algorithm is used to maximize the density within the core and to minimize the density 
within the periphery. This can be accomplished with a genetic algorithm first proposed by Borgatti 
and Everett (1999) and implemented in UCINET VI package (Borgatti et al., 2002).  The resulting 
partition of the network into core and peripheral members over the 9 year period of the study is 
depicted in figure 3 which shows trends for core and peripheral organizations annually. Note that 
starting from 2001 and throughout the post-jolt period the two curves have opposite trends with the 
periphery thinning and the core growing. The difference in size between these two partitions 
becomes increasingly less pronounced up to 2004, when the two trends change direction and the 
magnitude of the core-periphery divide picks some momentum once again. The number of 
peripheral organizations declines especially rapidly after 2001 while organizations in the core 
increase and subsequently almost stabilize.   
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Robustness checks 
An event focus tracks the evolution of an interorganizational field over time by examining structure 
through various ‘windows of time’ (Doreian, 1986). The window’s length depends on specific 
events. A key advantage of this approach is that both managers and researchers are likely to agree 
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that industry events provide more relevant ‘check points’ for network evolution than arbitrary time 
periods (Madhavan et al., 1998). Since the jolt we studied took place in September 11 2001, we 
chose 2001 as a starting year for the jolt period. This choice was driven both by previous 
contributions studying the effects of the 9/11 (Bradley et al., 2011) and by interviews with airline 
alliance managers. However, to test for the possibility that the duration of the post-jolt period may 
have a different length, we used alternative time windows. In particular, we re-ran our full model 
using the following windows for the jolt period: 1) 2001-2002, 2) 2002-2003, and 3) 2002-2004.  
Results from these analyses – available from the authors – do not differ substantially from the 
results obtained with the 2001-2003 time window for the jolt period. 
 In order to control for alternative measures of the dynamics in the local (triadic) structure, 
we run transitive ties effect which is similar to the transitive triads effect, but instead of considering 
for each other actor j how many two-paths i → h → j there are, it only considers whether there is at 
least one such indirect connection (Ripley et al., 2013).  This analysis – available from the authors – 
did not yield different results from the model with the transitive triads thus providing additional 
robustness to our results. Additionally, to explore the changes in relational logics presaged in the 
figures and tables presented above, we offer in the appendix additional insights into the triadic 
combination of core and peripheral organizations in the pre-, during and post- jolt periods.     
 
DISCUSSION 
Accounting for social change is one of the enduring problems of social science. Many such 
accounts paint organizations as “plaint in response to exogenous shocks, whose effects appear to 
radiate outward like a tsunami toppling those in its path” (Powell and Owen-Smith, 2012: 466). 
Whether in the form of social upheavals, technological disruptions, regulatory change or 
environmental shocks (e.g., Davis et al., 1994; Kraatz and Moore, 2002; Meyer et al., 2005), jolts 
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can disturb field-level consensus triggering alternative logics of action and interaction and thus 
rupturing the creation and re-creation of stable systems of relationships. Unfortunately, these 
punctuated accounts of organizational life do not tell us much about how organizations restructure 
their ties after such convulsive moments, and even less explored is the subsequent evolutionary 
trajectory of the network in which such organizations are embedded. We sought to address this gap 
through an analytical strategy rooted in the understanding of markets as fields (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992) structured by relationships that both channel the flow of information and 
resources and provide signals of status and identity. These networks mark past experiences but are 
also a roadmap of future prospects. Thus, by examining the dynamics of interorganizational tie 
formation and dissolution over time we set out to expose changes in the logics of attachment 
guiding actors’ interorganizational affiliations in the aftermath of an exogenous shock.  
Drawing on rich qualitative as well as quantitative evidence on the interorganizational 
structuration of the global field of commercial airlines in response to the terroristic attacks of 
September 11 2001, we illustrated a pattern of network transformation conducive to a gradually less 
stratified and more inclusive field. Through a combination of methods ranging from the analysis of 
interview material, to social network analysis to actor-based statistical modelling we documented 
the emergence of a blended logic of partner selection that combines both “conservatism” through 
triadic closure and outreach to peripheral members through disassortativity and preferential 
avoidance. Purely from the perspective of network dynamics, the picture suggested by the analysis 
of the mechanisms of network change is that the members of the network respond to the negative 
shock by pursuing a mix of consolidating and expansive ties (i.e. a hybrid network structure). They 
consolidate positions by closing open triads at a greater rate, thereby increasing their embeddedness 
into the network, but they simultaneously prospect for less connected members and newcomers, 
thus enabling the formation of a more permeable network core. This strikes us as particularly 
interesting, for two reasons. First, we surmise that this tension between cohesion and outreach to 
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peripheral members is key to determine the overall poisedness of the field in the face of exogenous 
shocks. In the airline industry the mix of conserving and prospective ties has resulted in a porous 
core that neither calcified nor dramatically transformed despite the major turmoil that shook the 
system. Exploring the durability and resiliency of these at least partially diverging 
interorganizational arrangements that emerge in response to external shocks is a fascinating area for 
future inquiry. Second, research on the social structure of fields has had relatively little to say so far 
in respect to possible mechanisms that may curb the stratification order that conserves the privileges 
of the field’s core members. One possibility suggested here is that the environmental jolt creates  an 
‘occasion’ for field restructuring by catalysing the emergence of a less skewed distribution of 
interorganizational ties and fostering greater integration between the core and the periphery of the 
network. And the fact that these affiliation dynamics persist both in the immediacy of the jolt and in 
the longer term suggests that the rewiring of the network is not a temporary response to a situation 
of sudden crisis but the expression of a new logic of interaction that comes into existence.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Research on the formation and dissolution of interorganizational ties has been flourishing in 
management and sociology (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Madhavan et al., 1998; Powell et al., 
2005). By progressively recognizing that actors in an interorganizational field are not only situated 
in space but also in time, these and other studies have contributed to a better understanding of how 
and why fields evolve to take the forms that they do. Much of this research has highlighted the role 
of the endogenous influence of the network structure in which an organization is embedded in 
affecting that organization’s opportunities to select its partners and so position itself in the field. 
Existing structures have been found to provide social cues about the reliability of future partners 
and their competencies which in turn reduce the search costs and the risks associated with 
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opportunism (Gulati, 1995). Yet, not all ties are predicted by network endogeneity and other factors 
other than network structure may motivate tie dynamics.  
In this study we have focused on one such factor exogenous to the network and to the entire 
field, as an attempt to move away from accounts of  how networks reproduce themselves and gain 
instead a better understanding of  why and how logics of attachment change. Indeed, it is relatively 
unknown “whether different mechanisms play greater or lesser roles as networks evolve” (Rivera et 
al., 2010: 108). A central contribution of our study, therefore, is to expose such mechanisms and 
show how they change over time as a result of an exogenous shock that undermines the calculations 
on which field relations had been based.  
From a methodological standpoint we wish to emphasize that the mechanisms of tie 
formation and dissolution we have examined rest on complex processes, operating both at the level 
of actors’ attributes and at the endogenous level of their relationships. The interplay of these 
mechanisms makes the disambiguation of causal relationships in the dynamics of tie formation and 
dissolution particularly hard to pin down (Rivera et al., 2010). Achieving this goal is made more 
difficult by the methodological challenge of endogeneizing network change (Fligstein and Stone 
Sweet, 2002) due to the composite dependence structure of the tie variables. The statistical 
modelling approach we use in this paper offers a distinctive and powerful toolkit for addressing this 
issue. It is distinctive because it focuses on the evolution of the entire network, and not only on 
dyadic tie formation, which can account simultaneously for generative mechanisms across different 
levels without making unrealistic assumptions of dyadic independence, thus allowing us to model 
interdependencies and assess network evolution properly (Ferriani et al., 2013). It is also powerful 
because it is based on maximum-likelihood estimation, which has been shown to be superior in 
estimating network change compared to the pseudo-likelihood estimators traditionally used for 
inference from exponential random graph models (Van Duijn et al., 2009). The stochastic actor-
based models for network dynamics implemented by SIENA rely on simulations for estimation and 
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testing and can be compared to other simulation based methods: they embody a logic similar to 
agent-based models (ABMs; Gilbert, 2008) in that they focus on the micro-mechanisms of actors 
choices as drivers of macro-structural change. The difference with ABMs is that SIENA models are 
based on observed rather than simulated data. They can also be compared to other network 
modelling approaches, like exponential random graph models (ERGMs; Robins et al., 2007), which 
also overcome the estimation and testing problems posed by network interdependence. ERGMs, 
however, are cross-sectional and “can best be understood as a model of a process in equilibrium” 
(Snijders et al., 2010: 57), while SIENA models are longitudinal and more general than ERGMs, 
because they do not require the equilibrium assumption. By using SIENA to analyse the evolution 
of the interfirm collaboration network in the airline industry, our study aims to contribute to the 
small but growing research that uses stochastic actor-oriented model for network dynamics (Ebbers 
and Wijnberg, 2010; Balland et al., 2013; Ferriani et al., 2013). 
This research is not without caveats. The single and negative event we chose may put some 
limits to the generalizability of our results. First, given the idiosyncratic nature of each event, it is 
necessary to take into account the properties of shocks when examining their impact on networks. 
Future studies may start discriminating between different types of shocks based on several 
dimensions such as: 1) the sign of the shock (positive versus negative), 2) the locus in which the 
shock takes place (within or outside the field), 3) the influence field actors can exert on the event 
(low versus moderate), 4) the magnitude of the shock (low versus high impact), and its 5) duration 
(short-term versus long-term). Moreover, field-specific factors may influence the relationship 
between the type of shock and the network rewiring that ensues. Examples of such factors include, 
among others, the stage of maturity of the industry and the distinction between service and 
manufacturing industries. The patterns found in our study may for instance not be the same in less 
bureaucratic and younger industries. Third, an issue worth noting is that the exogenous shock we 
focused on took place somewhat in between two other disruptive events: the Asian financial crisis, 
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widely regarded as an environmental jolt that suddenly reduced global environmental munificence 
(Wan and Yiu, 2009), which reached its apex in the period 1998-1999; and the pandemic crisis 
caused by SARS in 2003. The sequencing of these events (Asian crisis, 9/11, SARS) over a 
relatively short span of time (6 years) means that some of their effects may have been intertwined. 
For instance, it is quite possible that some airlines may have first changed their dynamics of 
affiliation in response to the Asian crisis and then reinforced such transition in response to 9/11 first 
and the SARS next. This may explain the acceleration observed in triadic closure and, more 
generally, the persistence of all network effects in the post-jolt period. If this is indeed the case, the 
sample may have provided us with a conservative test of our central claim that jolts have the 
potential to subvert the field’s prevailing logics of attachment. Finally, interesting results could 
emerge from the interactions between different levels of analysis. For instance, using the variables 
we identified in this paper future research could explore: 1) whether transitive triads between firms 
sharing a common attribute are more likely to occur before or after an environmental jolt, 2) 
whether homophilous ties are more likely when two firms share a common partner before and after 
an environmental jolt. We hope our initial findings provide new insights, encouraging scholars to 
undertake more research on situations far from equilibrium and explore their effects on the 
evolution of networks and fields. 
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Notes 
1. Constellation members are linked through dyadic collaborative agreements but not all of 
them are necessarily tied to one another (Gomes-Casseres, 1994). In other words, ties with 
non-constellation members and with members of other constellations are still possible.   
2.  We followed the division suggested in the Airline Business magazine which identifies six 
regions: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Central-South America, Europe, Middle East and North 
America. The patterns of the average degrees from the six geographical areas showed a 
similarity among the companies from the northern hemisphere (Asia-Pacific, Europe and 
North-America) on one hand, and those from the southern on the other, with the former 
characterized by similar and higher average degrees across the period of observation. Since 
exogenous covariates are included in SIENA models for controlling actors’ degree 
heterogeneity, we aggregated the six geographical areas in the two hemispheres to reflect the 
heterogeneity of these two patterns, without burdening the estimation with redundant 
parameters. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Details of key informants 
Company Position Region of origin
Aeroflot Deputy General Director for Strategy and Alliances Europe
Aeromexico Director Alliances Latin America
Austrian Senior Director Partner Management Europe
CSA Czech Airlines Head of Alliances & International Relations Europe
Delta Director Alliances North America
JAL Alliance Manager Asia-Pacific
KLM Senior VP Strategy & Corporate Development Europe
Lufthansa Senior Manager Alliances and Cooperations Europe
n.a. Former CEO oneworld North America
SkyTeam VP Sales Europe
SWISS Head of Emergency Response Process Management Europe
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) 
Nr. of Companies
Companies from North Hemisphere*
(%) 89 (70.1%) 89 (70.1%) 87 (69.6%) 89 (71.2%) 85 (72.0%) 82 (71.3%) 81 (72.3%) 78 (71.6%) 77 (72.0%)
Average Experience
(Std. Dev.) 42.03 (22.77) 43.03 (22.77) 44.62 (22.46) 45.27 (22.94) 45.58 (23.51) 46.69 (23.63) 48.23 (23.52) 49.43 (23.72) 50.35 (23.81)
Average Fleet Size
(Std. Dev.) 95.83 (125.81) 80.38 (119.89) 81.03 (122.31) 80.76 (123.49) 81.97 (117.48) 82.95 (111.88) 92.35 (115.77) 88.97 (115.78) 98.67 (115.99)
Average GDP Growth
(Std. Dev.) 0.025 (0.04) 0.035 (0.03) 0.046 (0.02) 0.025 (0.02) 0.030 (0.03) 0.039 (0.03) 0.053 (0.03) 0.047 (0.03) 0.054 (0.03)
Average Load Factor
(Std. Dev.) 0.667 (0.06) 0.665 (0.07) 0.678 (0.07) 0.676 (0.06) 0.685 (0.07) 0.680 (0.06) 0.708 (0.06) 0.714 (0.06) 0.733 (0.06)
Average Passengers
(Std. Dev.) 12.10 (17.99) 11.71 (17.88) 12.07 (18.01) 12.70 (18.00) 12.58 (17.97) 12.32 (17.86) 14.72 (19.74) 14.72 (20.58) 16.56 (20.85)
* North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific
2005 2006
127 127 125 125 118 115 112 109 107
Descriptive Statistics:
Nr. of Companies, Region, Experience, Fleet Size, GDP Growth, Load  Factor, Passengers
2000 2001 2002 2003 20041998 1999
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Table 3. Correlation matrix (degree assortativity) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1. Degree (Density)
2. North Hemisphere 0.368
3. Same Hemisphere -0.551 -0.384
4. Alliance Member 0.207 -0.093 0.010
5. Same Alliance -0.082 0.022 -0.089 -0.361
6. Experience 0.115 0.245 -0.020 -0.226 0.026
7. Experience Similarity -0.029 0.041 0.057 0.057 -0.055 -0.282
8. Fleet Size 0.014 -0.043 -0.027 0.073 -0.063 -0.136 0.052
9. Fleet Size Similarity 0.029 -0.029 -0.038 0.074 -0.046 -0.061 0.020 0.802
10. GDP Growth -0.073 0.024 0.002 0.054 -0.011 0.055 0.026 0.021 0.029
11. GDP Growth Similarity -0.074 0.050 -0.024 -0.062 0.007 -0.102 0.032 -0.064 -0.036 -0.102
12. Load Factor -0.038 -0.195 0.040 -0.082 0.012 -0.062 0.046 0.040 0.074 -0.107 -0.128
13. Load Factor Similarity -0.016 0.147 -0.050 0.000 0.015 0.062 -0.119 -0.028 -0.065 -0.041 0.021 -0.246
14. Passengers 0.076 0.029 -0.014 -0.112 0.040 0.163 -0.071 -0.851 -0.663 -0.019 0.033 -0.092 -0.016
15. Passengers Similarity 0.041 0.045 -0.017 -0.106 0.026 0.118 -0.051 -0.630 -0.838 -0.035 0.010 -0.098 0.028 0.766
16. Transitive Triads 0.201 -0.009 -0.045 0.034 -0.347 -0.015 -0.010 0.065 -0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.014 -0.048 -0.017 0.022
17. Degree Assortativity -0.657 -0.210 0.034 -0.253 0.259 -0.205 0.017 -0.078 -0.050 0.051 0.083 -0.029 -0.018 -0.045 -0.032 -0.644
18. Degree (Density) x Dummy 2001-2003 0.092 -0.038 0.033 -0.012 -0.013 0.005 -0.014 0.049 0.016 0.012 -0.023 -0.062 -0.011 -0.040 -0.018 -0.001 -0.042
19. Degree (Density) x Dummy 2003-2006 0.279 0.069 -0.020 0.036 0.005 -0.067 -0.001 0.034 0.021 -0.168 0.082 -0.174 0.060 -0.008 -0.025 0.002 -0.128 0.312
20. Degree Assortativity x Dummy 2001-2003 0.009 0.113 -0.048 -0.050 0.025 0.053 0.018 0.042 0.054 0.016 -0.032 0.016 0.011 -0.006 -0.010 0.054 -0.064 -0.693 -0.237
21. Degree Assortativity x Dummy 2003-2006 -0.073 0.063 -0.010 -0.021 -0.014 0.078 0.006 0.034 -0.021 0.028 -0.037 0.018 -0.016 -0.014 0.060 0.097 -0.065 -0.297 -0.682 0.486
22. Transitive Triads x Dummy 2001-2003 -0.057 -0.098 0.056 0.008 -0.047 -0.043 0.018 -0.020 -0.028 0.027 -0.002 0.000 -0.013 0.001 0.001 -0.054 0.075 0.201 0.081 -0.730 -0.390
23. Transitive Triads x Dummy 2003-2006 -0.051 -0.072 0.040 -0.037 -0.046 -0.036 0.060 0.008 0.015 0.057 -0.034 0.024 0.007 -0.032 -0.046 -0.099 0.100 0.101 0.155 -0.374 -0.704 0.523
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Correlation matrix (degree of alter) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1. Degree (Density)
2. North Hemisphere 0.408
3. Same Hemisphere -0.480 -0.452
4. Alliance Member 0.241 -0.113 -0.015
5. Same Alliance -0.185 0.012 0.055 -0.406
6. Experience 0.188 0.196 -0.030 -0.231 0.057
7. Experience Similarity -0.062 0.007 0.029 0.040 -0.046 -0.277
8. Fleet Size 0.061 -0.038 -0.058 0.020 -0.035 -0.145 0.021
9. Fleet Size Similarity 0.054 -0.028 -0.071 0.037 -0.024 -0.087 0.010 0.824
10. GDP Growth -0.032 0.042 -0.006 0.030 0.018 0.135 -0.015 0.002 0.037
11. GDP Growth Similarity -0.015 0.064 -0.018 -0.039 -0.004 -0.056 0.007 -0.013 0.015 -0.097
12. Load Factor 0.032 -0.148 0.013 -0.059 0.035 -0.057 0.039 0.020 0.059 -0.136 -0.116
13. Load Factor Similarity -0.074 0.086 -0.077 -0.042 0.027 0.008 -0.075 -0.085 -0.104 -0.055 0.074 -0.207
14. Passengers 0.029 0.004 -0.008 -0.084 0.012 0.177 -0.054 -0.846 -0.671 0.002 0.010 -0.054 0.040
15. Passengers Similarity 0.012 0.014 0.007 -0.099 -0.003 0.138 -0.053 -0.631 -0.830 -0.049 -0.004 -0.053 0.049 0.765
16. Transitive Triads 0.280 0.040 -0.089 0.043 -0.317 -0.022 -0.010 0.021 -0.025 -0.002 0.056 -0.019 -0.047 0.009 0.035
17. Degree of Alter -0.833 -0.255 0.112 -0.255 0.232 -0.233 0.069 -0.063 -0.040 0.032 -0.008 -0.047 0.044 -0.044 -0.029 -0.544
18. Degree (Density) x Dummy 2001-2003 0.046 -0.044 0.081 -0.061 0.032 0.014 0.034 0.026 -0.011 -0.010 -0.023 -0.034 -0.012 -0.031 0.020 -0.024 -0.040
19. Degree (Density) x Dummy 2003-2006 0.129 -0.025 0.083 -0.009 0.000 -0.074 -0.006 0.004 0.022 -0.149 0.052 -0.111 -0.010 0.012 -0.005 -0.001 -0.078 0.307
20. Degree of Alter x Dummy 2001-2003 -0.006 0.069 -0.094 0.015 0.005 0.004 -0.040 0.009 0.034 0.080 0.007 0.023 -0.017 0.009 -0.037 0.019 0.019 -0.851 -0.278
21. Degree of Alter x Dummy 2003-2006 -0.043 0.069 -0.097 -0.022 0.036 0.017 0.003 0.051 -0.012 0.088 -0.006 0.022 0.027 -0.061 -0.008 0.031 0.021 -0.314 -0.843 0.394
22. Transitive Triads x Dummy 2001-2003 -0.033 -0.015 0.087 -0.003 -0.024 -0.025 0.022 0.019 0.018 -0.070 -0.026 -0.041 0.039 -0.036 -0.020 0.002 -0.006 0.293 0.084 -0.636 -0.245
23. Transitive Triads x Dummy 2003-2006 -0.026 -0.026 0.093 -0.005 -0.092 0.061 0.013 -0.007 0.018 -0.053 -0.054 -0.034 -0.013 0.013 0.002 -0.046 -0.002 0.120 0.232 -0.288 -0.585 0.461
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Table 4. SIENA models for the evolution of interorganizational networks 
Estim. SE p-value Estim. SE p-value Estim. SE p-value Estim. SE p-value Estim. SE p-value
Degree (Density) -0.870 0.048 <0.001 *** -1.124 0.060 <0.001 *** -1.240 0.080 <0.001 *** -1.075 0.065 <0.001 *** -1.241 0.085 <0.001 ***
North Hemisphere 0.143 0.090 0.113 -0.094 0.087 0.282 -0.127 0.088 0.150 -0.068 0.089 0.445 -0.120 0.091 0.187
Same Hemisphere 0.202 0.061 <0.001 *** 0.163 0.055 0.003 ** 0.162 0.054 0.003 ** 0.171 0.056 0.002 ** 0.182 0.057 0.001 **
Alliance Member 0.143 0.088 0.105 -0.049 0.087 0.570 -0.110 0.089 0.217 -0.082 0.092 0.370 -0.162 0.094 0.084 †
Same Alliance 1.336 0.127 <0.001 *** 0.600 0.137 <0.001 *** 0.696 0.140 <0.001 *** 0.580 0.141 <0.001 *** 0.714 0.141 <0.001 ***
Experience 0.007 0.002 <0.001 *** 0.002 0.002 0.243 0.001 0.002 0.518 0.002 0.002 0.222 0.001 0.002 0.617
Experience Similarity -0.251 0.110 0.022 * -0.198 0.110 0.072 † -0.188 0.109 0.084 † -0.195 0.115 0.090 † -0.175 0.109 0.110
Fleet Size 0.000 0.001 0.716 0.000 0.001 0.934 0.000 0.001 0.758 0.000 0.001 1.000 0.000 0.001 0.817
Fleet Size Similarity 0.727 0.543 0.181 0.323 0.597 0.588 0.184 0.647 0.776 0.251 0.577 0.664 0.136 0.627 0.828
GDP Growth 1.465 1.090 0.179 1.844 1.093 0.092 † 1.914 1.069 0.073 † 1.442 1.107 0.192 1.490 1.171 0.203
GDP Growth Similarity 0.962 0.316 0.002 ** 1.183 0.313 <0.001 *** 1.229 0.321 <0.001 *** 1.142 0.315 <0.001 *** 1.176 0.308 <0.001 ***
Load Factor -0.095 0.635 0.881 -0.208 0.644 0.747 -0.349 0.638 0.584 -0.687 0.650 0.290 -0.811 0.649 0.211
Load Factor Similarity 0.317 0.239 0.185 0.132 0.235 0.576 0.108 0.241 0.653 0.119 0.236 0.614 0.109 0.241 0.651
Passengers 0.009 0.007 0.209 0.005 0.007 0.526 0.004 0.007 0.574 0.005 0.007 0.532 0.004 0.007 0.588
Passengers Similarity -0.455 0.492 0.355 -0.311 0.525 0.553 -0.300 0.552 0.587 -0.231 0.506 0.649 -0.257 0.523 0.623
Transitive Triads 0.309 0.021 <0.001 *** 0.275 0.020 <0.001 *** 0.307 0.021 <0.001 *** 0.267 0.019 <0.001 ***
Degree Assortativity 0.000 0.000 0.182 -0.001 0.000 0.096 †
Degree of Alter 0.008 0.008 0.305 0.010 0.008 0.202
Degree (Density) x Dummy 2001-2003 0.220 0.110 0.046 * 0.255 0.151 0.091 †
Degree (Density) x Dummy 2003-2006 0.358 0.113 0.002 ** 0.424 0.148 0.004 **
Degree Assortativity x Dummy 2001-2003 -0.001 0.001 0.046 *
Degree Assortativity x Dummy 2003-2006 -0.001 0.001 0.030 *
Degree of Alter x Dummy 2001-2003 -0.025 0.016 0.134
Degree of Alter x Dummy 2003-2006 -0.033 0.015 0.023 *
Transitive Triads x Dummy 2001-2003 0.157 0.053 0.003 ** 0.133 0.048 0.006 **
Transitive Triads x Dummy 2003-2006 0.095 0.047 0.042 * 0.083 0.041 0.04 *
† p<0.1, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Controls ControlsMain Effects
Controls
Main Effects
Time Heterogeneity
Model 1 Model 2a Model 3aModel 2b
Controls
Main Effects
Model 3b
Controls
Main Effects
Time Heterogeneity
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Figure 1. Constellation membership evolution  
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Figure 2. Degree distributions in the pre-, during, and post-jolt periods 
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Figure 3. Annual count of core and peripheral organizations, 1998-2006, full sample 
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APPENDIX 
 
Consider the table below where we partitioned the closed triads for the three representative time 
periods (1998, 2002, and 2006) and by type of triad. With respect to the type of closed triad, we 
distinguish among core triads that link three members of the core (C-C-C); periphery triads that link 
three members of the periphery (P-P-P); core-periphery triads that link two members of the core and 
one member of the periphery (C-C-P) and periphery-core triads that link two members of the 
periphery and one member of the core (P-P-C). The number of closed triads snowballs through the 
decade. In 1998 there were 310 closed triads and more than twice as much in 2006. As the overall 
field becomes less stratified in the post-jolt periods, it also increases its internal cohesiveness as 
more pathways between the core and the periphery are created.  
 
Table 1. Closed triads by year and type 
 
 
1998 2002 2006 
C-C-C 205 314 339 
C-C-P 90 120 214 
P-P-P 5 19 18 
P-P-C 10 38 69 
Total  310 491 640 
  
In the turmoil and uncertainty that follows the tragic events of the early 2000s, all field 
members become increasingly embedded into the network. Yet, it is the dramatic upsurge in the 
amalgamation of core and peripheral players that stands out most vividly in these cohesive 
dynamics. Indeed, closed blended triads involving both core and peripheral members exhibit by far 
the strongest increases in the post jolt period, with C-C-P triads growing two and half times and P-
45 
 
P-C triads showing the sharpest increase, with a sevenfold jump. Cohesion within the core remains 
dominant throughout the period, with C-C-C triads accounting for well over 50% of the total 
triangles in the in the network. But at the same time core members become more involved with 
peripheral players, using their gravitational pull to draw peripheral players closer and embed them 
into core interconnections. The core, in other words, grows more cohesive, but not at the expenses 
of the periphery. Instead, this growth appears to be the result of a well-connected yet increasingly 
permeable core. As more organizations are entwined in the core, the logic of attachment shifts.  
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